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ABSTRACT 
The starting point of the paper is that trade unions engage in substitution once certain 
targets have been met. This implies that a priority-based or hierarchical model might be a 
better approximation to union behaviour. This model requires a two-part union utility 
function which changes when a satisfactory (or target) level of the priority variable (e.g. the 
wage rate) is met. After demonstrating the workings of such a model in a monopoly union 
framework, it is shown that when the wage is below the target level,  there is real wage 
rigidity. Employment increases only when the target wage has been achieved.  
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TRADE UNION PRIORITIES AND WAGE RIGIDITY 
 
I. Introduction 
The essence of hierarchical or priority based models is that preferences are ordered in the 
sense that most important or urgent preferences must reach some satisfactory levels 
before the secondary ones are considered. This implies that substitution among objectives 
might not be continuous. The idea is not  new economics. One can even find it in the work 
of the nineteenth century economist C. Menger and also in the work of subsequent 
economists like Little (1957), and Georgescu-Roegen (1966). It is also not unknown in 
other social sciences like psychology and sociology. In particular, Maslow's theory of needs 
is the prime example (Maslow,1954). Moreover, hierarchical models have been employed 
in other branches of economics such as consumer behaviour theory and the theory of the 
firm (e.g. Ferguson,1965; Encarnacion,1964). However, there has been very little attempt 
to apply it in analysing trade union behaviour. The idea that the secondary objectives are 
satisfied only when the most important ones reach some acceptable target levels seems 
highly appropriate in approximating the behaviour of union organizations with many, and 
often conflicting, objectives.  Such an approach is consistent with the views of authors such 
as Ross who regard trade unions as extremely complex organizations characterized by 
economic, political and social goals.   
 
Thus the purpose of this paper is to provide some insights concerning the effects of 
adopting a priority-based model in a trade union framework. The paper starts with a brief 
review of the standard approach towards union utility.  Subsequently, the basic 
characteristics of a general priority-based  model as applied to union utility are discussed. 
Furthermore, a simple model of a union with two objectives and which is characterized by 
priority-based or hierarchical behaviour is examined.  The analysis is conducted in a 
monopoly union framework. 
 
 
II Standard Formulations of Union Behaviour  
 
The usual representation of union preferences is of an one part, increasing quasi-concave 
union utility function which can be derived from the assumptions that 1) all union members 
are risk averse and 2) that the union has utilitarian preferences.  Thus convex union 
indifference curves are derived which imply that there is continuous  substitutability 
between the two standard variables, wages (w) and employment (n) (Oswald, 1982).  
Although as we shall discuss, not all theorists accept the above, many authors such as 
Akerlof (1969) Atherton (1973), Corden (1981), Mulvey (1978), Oswald (1982, 1985) and 
Rees (1977) have used such an assumption.  Other authors  use as a general start a 
Stone-Geary utility function, but the vast majority of them eventually derive the standard 
smooth union indifference curves.  The essence of implicit substitutability in terms of 
preference comparison can be seen in the following formulation : 
 
Suppose that we have union objectives represented by the vectors (P means preferred to): 
 
 (w1, n1) and (w2, n2) and that 
  
 (w1, n1) P (w2, n2) 
  
The assumption of continuous substitutability implies that there is a w > w2 for which 
 
 (w, n2) P (w1, n1) 
 
This type of preferences is sometimes called Archimedian in the theory of choice (Borch, 
1968).  In short, Archimedian preferences imply that the union engages in continuous 
substitution among objectives. 
 
However, there have been theoretical studies which cast doubt on the idea of a continuous 
substitutability between employment and wages or among union objectives in general.  
One of the first of such studies was conducted by  A. Ross who had serious reservations 
about the wage-employment trade-off relationship.  Ross's approach is more complex and 
connects union behaviour with considerations such as the proportion of labour costs to total 
costs, the competitiveness  of the industry and the level of unionization of the industry 
(Ross, 1950).  Furthermore, Ross argues that unions are not so much concerned with the 
maximum possible wage increase, as with relative as opposed to absolute wages. (This 
idea can also be connected to Keynes' point that relativities matter, Ross, 1948.)   Ross's 
idea that unions attempt to enforce the common rule of "equal pay for equal work"  has also 
found support among subsequent  theorists (see for instance King, 1990).  In the same 
spirit, Reder doubts the established view that unions maximize in the sense of consumer or 
the theory of the firm.  Instead, he is inclined towards the satisficing model (Reder, 1952, 
1960).  These ideas suggest that unions might consider certain levels of pay and 
employment as essential before they undertake substitution. 
The notion of the continuous substitutability between employment and wages has also 
been questioned by other theorists.  Cartter for instance states : 
 
 
"it would seem most likely, once a union is already enjoying a particular wage-
employment combination, that it would take a considerable increase in wages to 
compensate for a reduction in employment, and it would take a considerable 
increase in employment to compensate for a wage reduction (Cartter, 1959). 
 
The reason for the limited substitutability according to Cartter  is mainly the internal political 
structures and pressures of the union (Cartter, 1959; Mayhew and Turnbull, 1989, 
Atherton, 1973). 
 
More recently some theorists have suggested that the very practice of focusing solely on 
wages and employment is also questionable.  Instead they suggest that unions are 
confronted with organizing and representing the entire spectrum of needs that union 
members experience (Turnbull, 1988).  This approach also undermines the idea of 
continuous substitutability of wages and employment since it brings on the surface a variety 
of conflicting union objectives (some of them not quantifiable)  which need to be satisfied.  
Faced with conflicting objectives and a variety of members' needs, the union might have 
limited room for substitution.  A connection can be made here with Simon's (1982) concept 
of bounded rationality which is more appropriate when choice (in this case union choice) 
involves a number of variables. 
 
The above ideas can be interpreted as suggesting that union behaviour cannot be 
adequately described by the assumption of continuous substitutability among objectives.  
Instead, the idea of limited substitutability which can best be represented with some type of 
hierarchical behaviour is more appropriate.  In particular, hierarchical behaviour in this 
context implies that the union would wish to achieve certain levels of some objectives first 
before starting considering substitution; eg. a certain level of wage increase (depending on 
which objective is regarded as the most important)  or a certain level of membership before 
engaging in substitution.  In other words, after a "satisficing"  level is achieved, the union 
would be prepared to substitute among objectives.  Although hierarchical formulations have 
been proposed, (e.g. Ferguson, 1965, Georgescu-Roegen, 1966 Encarnacion, 1964b, 
Ironmonger, 1972, Day and Robinson, 1973, Canterbery, 1979, Earl, 1983, Drakopoulos, 
1992) they have generally not received attention in connection to union behaviour. 
 
In essence Ross's conception of the union is not that alien to the spirit of the hierarchical 
formulation.  For instance, King supports the view that Ross's ideas correspond more 
closely to Simon's satisficing theory which is quite close to hierarchical behaviour (King, 
1990 and Simon, 1982).  Furthermore, some theorists seem to favour a type of hierarchical 
formulation when they formulate models of strikes.  For instance, Ashenfelter and Johns 
and Swint and Nelson employ the idea that union leadership is interested in providing 
"some acceptable level of members benefits first" which is quite close to the suggested 
approach (Ashenfelter and Johnson, 1969, Swint and Nelson, 1978, 1980). 
 
The idea that the complexity of union behaviour cannot be adequately described by the 
standard approach, has started to gain ground even in the mainstream union literature. For 
instance, some theorists have realized that the issue of insiders-outsiders requires a two 
part union utility function. In some modern formulations, the union utility changes when  a 
certain level of employment is achieved. The important implication of this specification is  
that employment is the primary objective up to a certain level. The resulting union 
indifference curves have a kink point (see Carruth and Oswald, 1987 and Jones and 
McKenna,1989). It is clear that this approach is not very far from the proposed priority 
based model.  
 
 
III Formulation of Priority Based Union Utility  
 
 
Starting from the general case that the union has a number of objectives, its behaviour may 
be described by the following hierarchical formulation.  Assume that each objective i has a 
variable zi which corresponds to it.  Also assume that the numbering: 
z1, z2, ....., zn 
 
is such that the problem of the union is the following: 
max zn 
s.t. 
zi > zi* (i = 1, 2, ...., n-1) 
 
the zi* is a constant and represents satisfactory levels of corresponding variables.  If the 
above problem has not solution, then the problem  becomes: 
 
max zn-1 
s.t. 
zi > zi* (i = 1, 2,...., n-2) 
 
In other words the least important objective is dropped.  If the above has no solution one 
works similarly until a feasible problem is determined, all lower ordered objectives are 
discarded en route. 
 
We can express this general case in the utility terms.  Let 
 
u1 = u1 (z) 
 
be a function which orders alternatives z according to the first objective.  Fixing arbitrarily 
the functions u1 (z), there is a unique vector  associated with each z which might be called 
utility vector 
 
[u1(z), u2(z),...., un(z)] 
 
the union's utility function can be defined in terms of such vectors.  Also we have a 
constant ui* such that when  
ui(z) = ui* 
 
z satisfies objective i. 
 
Given the above let us compare two utility vectors: 
 
[u1(z), u2(z),...., u (z)] = u (z) 
[u1(z'), u2(z'),...., u(z')] = u (z') 
then 
u(z) > u(z') iff 
either 1) u1 (z') < u1 (z) < u1* 
or     2) u1 (z) = u1 (z') < u1* ; u2 (z') < u2 (z) 
or     3) u1* < u1 (z'), u1 (z); u2 (z') < u2(z) < u2* 
 
:                  :                   : 
 Thus there is a hierarchical ordering of vectors.  Once the more important objectives are 
satisfied the next most important ones become relevant.  (For a technical discussion of 
hierarchy, utility and the types of hierarchical behaviour see Encarnacion, 1964a).  
 
The above ideas can be applied to  a simple framework of a union utility with two 
objectives: wages (w) and employment (n). Let us assume that the union has a target wage 
level and that this is its primary objective. There are a number of reasons for adopting the 
idea of a target wage. First, one might connect the target wage rate to the previous period 
wage rate. The underlying point here is the Keynesian view that wage cuts are not 
acceptable. One might also think of a union which has as its first concern to achieve an 
appropriate wage rate by taking into account the rest of the industry's wage or the national 
wages. The idea of comparing wage levels has been used by Summers (1988) in his 
relative wage-based efficiency wage theory. Another justification might lie in the "fair wage" 
literature (see Akerlof and Yellen,1990). 
 
One can also a make a connection  with work on union centralization (see for instance 
Calmfors and Driffill, 1988). More specifically, the idea of target wage is more compatible 
with a relatively centralized bargaining framework. In a centralized wage bargaining 
framework, the idea of a  wage target as first priority is more relevant. The union will be 
very concerned to reach a wage level which is compatible with  wages reached in national 
wage bargaining agreements (Flanagan, Moene and Wallerstein, 1993). Thus the target 
wage can be linked with national or industry wage settlements. In other words, it is more 
likely that the union will exhibit priority-based behaviour towards the wage in a more 
centralized economic environment. Conversely, if wage bargaining is done at the individual 
firm's level (thus in a decentralized framework), the traditional model in which the union 
continuously substitutes between employment and wages, seems to be more applicable. 
 
With all the above in mind, let us call the target wage rate w*.   The easiest way to 
represent the priority-based model is by constructing  a general two-part union utility 
function:  
 
        U (w,n) = {U1 (w,n), U2 (w,n)} 
where   U (w,n) = U1     for w < w* 
and     U (w,n) = U2     for w > w*   
 
Having in mind the above, let us give a specific example of a very simple situation where 
the union members have two  objectives: wages and employment (w,n) and where the 
wage level is the primary target up to a given level w*. When w* is reached then the union 
turns its attention to the secondary objective, employment. In order to keep the analysis 
simple let us assume that union members are identical, that the outside opportunity is zero 
and that membership is unrestricted. Furthermore, we restrict our discussion to an interior 
solution which implies that membership is always higher than employment. The two-part 
union utility function is specified as follows: 
 
     
 wn   for w < w*    (1) 
 
U= 
 q(w-w*)n + w*n      for w > w*    (2) 
 
 
Where w is the wage rate, n is employment and q  is a constant and  O < q  < 1.  The first 
part of the utility function can also be viewed in terms of work sharing:  initially the union 
maximizes the wage bill and distributes it to its members (this  can be linked to  our  
previous assumptions, see also Dreze, 1987). The second part of the utility function implies 
that when the wage exceeds the target or the aspired level then it becomes a secondary 
objective but it still provides positive utility to the union.  The slope of the indifference curve 
is: 
 
     
                  w     
                - -- < O   for w < w*   (3) 
                  n 
 
dw 
-- = 
dn   
                 -(qw - qw* + w*) 
          ------------------  < 0 for w > w*  (4) 
    qn 
 
 
It is not hard to see that the union indifference curve will be kinked and negatively sloped.  
Only when q=1 the two slopes will be equal and thus there will be no kink. After checking 
for convexity, we can also see that in  the region close to w* we have: 
 
 
 
dw            dw 
--       >    -- 
dn lim w-) w*-          dn lim w-) w*+ 
 
 
 
Therefore the resulting indifference curve will have a kink at w*. 
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w* 
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Figure 1: The kinked union indifference curve 
 
            N 
Thus the priority-based approach gives kinked union indifference curves, and this is in contrast to 
the smooth curves implied by the standard theory. 
 
 
III Some Implications in a Monopoly Union Model 
  
We make the standard assumption that we operate in the context of a Monopoly Union 
model  (McDonald and Solow, 1981; Oswald, 1982, Mayhew and Turnbull, 1989).  This 
model implies that firm sets n in the sense that it chooses the n which maximises a profit 
function given as: 
 
 p = pf (n) - wn                                        (5) 
 
where p is profit and p is product price and f(n) is a strictly concave production function.  
Thus the firm's labour demand is n = g(w/p) with g'(w/p) < 0 and g" (w/p) = 0 for linear 
labour demand.  The effect on employment by an increase in product price is given by: 
 
 
 
dn  g'(w/p) 
-- = ------  [dw/dp - w/p]          (6) 
dp     p 
 
This means that if dw/dp is negative than (6) is positive.  Furthermore, it will be positive if 
the expression in the bracket is negative. 
 
We now take the first part of the utility function where w < w*.  The union sets the wage rate 
(w) given labour demand.  Thus the union's problem is:  
 
 
 
 
Max U = wn                              (7) 
  w   
s.t  
n = g(w/p) 
 
Applying the first order conditions, the following equation is the condition for a maximum: 
 
 
 
 w  -g(w/p) 
 -- = ------         (8) 
 p  g'(w/p) 
 
 
The above is the general specification of the model as far as the labour demand is 
concerned. Some authors have argued that it is more instructive  (and also empirically 
more valid) to concentrate to a log-linear labour demand which is derived from a constant 
elasticity production function (see for instance, Jones and McKenna,1989). Thus in our 
next step, which is a comparative statics analysis, we adopt the log-linear labour demand. 
The constant  elasticity form of production function is the following. 
 
f(N) = Na/a,     where a < 1                     (9) 
 
 
this results in the following labour demand form:: 
 
 
g(w/p) = (w/p)1/(a-1)                            (10) 
 
By utilizing the first order condition and relation (10), the comparative static result for w* > w 
is 
 
 
dw                        w 
--             =           --   > 0                             (11) 
dp w<w*               p 
 
This is a very important result since it implies real wage rigidity.  Combining the above with 
relation (6), we can see that dN/dp = 0 for constant elasticity labour demand. Thus, as long 
as the wage level is below the target level, a positive shock (increase in p) will always result 
in real wage increases, or put it differently, there is real wage rigidity. This result is clearly a 
Keynesian one. 
 
For the second part of the utility function (w > w*) we follow the same procedure.  The 
union sets the wage subject to labour demand.   
 
     
 
Max U = q(w-w*)n + w*n                           (12) 
  w          
s.t 
n = g(w/p) 
 
Applying the first order conditions, the following equation is the condition for maximum: 
    
 
 
         1        1 
  -qg(w/p) + - qw*g'(w/p) - - w*g'(w/p) 
w         p        p 
-- = -------------------------------------   (13) 
p    qg'(w/p) 
 
 
We concentrate on the constant elasticity production function and we follow exactly the 
same method as we did for the first part of the utility function. Having in mind the above, 
the comparative static result for w > w* is 
 
 
 
         dw            
sign     --            =  sign [2qp +w* +2aqw -aqp -2qw -qw*]  (14) 
         dp w>w*       
 
The sign of the above is ambiguous and clearly wage rigidity is not the case as it was for w 
< w*. However, we can gain some insight by performing some simulations. Let us first take 
the extreme values of q and a. The following table shows the sign of (15) assuming 
different combinations of extreme values. The table reports only the cases where the sign 
of dw/dp is negative. 
 
Simulations of  Extreme Values  
 
  a          q  w,p           Result 
  __________________________________________ 
 
  0 Range   w>p, w>>w*      - 
  0     1  w > p       - 
 
 
We can also do some actual simulations in the range of variables for different w, w* and p. 
 
First Simulation: p = 5, w = 10, w* = 9. 
If  a > 0.6 then the sign is positive irrespective of the value of q. If a < 0.6 and q < 0.5 the 
sign is positive. If a < 0.6 and q > 0.6 then the sign is negative in most cases (although not 
in all) 
 
Second Simulation: p = 5, w = 10, w* =9 
If a > 0.8 the result is positive irrespective of the value of q. If     a < 0.8 and q < 0.3 then 
the sign is positive. However, if  a < 0.8 and  q > 0.3 then the sign is negative. 
 
Third Simulation: p = 10, w = 15, w* =9 
All results are positive apart from the following simultaneous  values for a and q: a = 0.1, 
0.2, 0.3 and q = 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9. 
  
Now it is clear that if dw/dp for w > w* is negative,  then dn/dp is positive (if dw/dp is 
positive, the sign of dn/dp is ambiguous). 
 
 
With all the above in mind, it is possible to get possible wage paths. The interesting result 
here is that we derive kinked wage preference path. Relation (11) implies a vertical wage 
path up to w*. For w > w* the expression dw/dp  might become negative or positive 
depending on the sign of relation 14. A possible wage path can be seen for negative sign.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: a possible wage path for constant elasticity 
 labour demand 
 
 
 
 
The graph implies that if there is a positive shock (i.e. there is an exogenous increase in 
 
w* 
 
 
 
w 
N N1 
product price p), the union will take it as wage increases only. However, after  w*, there will 
be an increase in both wages and employment (the diagonal part of the graph). 
 
The kinked wage preference path can be compared with the standard approach and also 
with the Cartter and Marshall model (Cartter, 1959 and Cartter and Marshall, 1967).  
Moreover, it can be seen as a justification to possible empirical findings which might 
suggest a kinked wage preference path. 
 
The previous discussion has some interesting macroeconomic implications. First, there are 
no employment effects when the wage is below the target level since we have real wage 
rigidity. Second, since employment is likely to increase only when the wage rate is 
sufficiently high, a strong shock is needed in order to have significant effect on 
employment. However, the wage rate is likely to be sufficiently high in the boom stage of 
the business cycle. This could explain why employment increases significantly during a 
boom period (procyclical employment increase). 
 
It would also be interesting to compare the macroeconomic implications with the possible 
ones derived under the traditional approach. First of all, the union indifference curves will 
be smooth since the traditional approach implies a single union utility function. This means 
that the wage path will not be kinked, -as in fig. 2- but it would be continuous. The 
important macroeconomic implication here is that positive shocks will only result in wage 
increases. This is in contrast to our results where employment increases after the target 
wage has been reached. Thus, in this framework, the traditional approach cannot offer an  
explanation for the commonly observed increases in employment during a boom period.  
 
VII Conclusion 
 
If we accept that the union is a complex organization with conflicting objectives and 
complicated social and economic roles, then the mainstream assumption of continuous 
substitutability among objectives might not be appropriate.  Instead, the paper suggested 
that unions engage in substitution once certain targets have been met. This idea was 
connected to the writings of a number of theorists concerning the nature of the trade 
unions. Given these, the paper argued that a priority-based or hierarchical model might be 
a better approximation to union behaviour. Furthermore, the priority-based model might be 
more appropriate in countries where the degree of union centralization is relatively high.  It 
was also shown that the priority-based model implies a two part union utility function which 
changes when a satisfactory level of the priority variable (i.e the wage rate) is  met. The 
two-part union utility implies kinked union indifference curves, and this is in contrast to the 
smooth curves derived from the traditional approach. 
 
Consequently, the paper demonstrated the workings of such a model in a monopoly union 
framework.   It was seen that when the wage rate is below the target level, then there is 
real wage rigidity. Employment increases took place only when the target wage has been 
achieved. It is reasonable to assume that  the wage rate is more likely to exceed the target 
during a  boom  period. Thus, the hierarchical trade union model might be an additional 
explanation to both real wage rigidity and to the fact that significant employment increases 
happen during a boom. 
 
In general it is hoped that the paper will provide a  stimulus for further research into the 
consequences of relaxing the mainstream assumption of continuous substitutability in 
relation to union behaviour for instance with respect to union bargaining and strikes. 
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